Risk
Expected loss for this member on this product, from a model calibrated on your own book rather than a bureau cut off. This is the floor beneath the price, not the price.
Price and offer optimisation for lenders who have to hold more than one objective at once. Expected loss from the risk model, take up from the response model, attrition from the retention model, and a rate set against return on assets, growth and member benefit together.
Discuss LuminoOffer →Three models sit underneath every rate, and only one of them is the risk score.
Expected loss for this member on this product, from a model calibrated on your own book rather than a bureau cut off. This is the floor beneath the price, not the price.
The probability this member accepts at this rate, estimated per segment, product and channel. Without it, a price is a guess dressed as a calculation.
What the rate does to the chance they refinance away, and what that costs across the remaining life of the relationship. For a mutual this usually outweighs the margin on the loan itself.
Enter the objectives, the constraints your board has signed off and the market rules you operate under. The engine returns a rate card that respects all three, with the binding constraint named against every price.
Band E prices above the ceiling you set, so no rate is offered rather than one you would not want written. Relaxing the market position rule to the 70th percentile adds six basis points and takes attrition to 3.6%, outside your target.
Illustrative example. The optimiser reports what bound each price, so a rate you disagree with can be traced to the rule that produced it.
Optimisation runs offline across the whole segment grid and produces a rate card. Pricing an individual application is then a lookup against that card, which is what makes it fast, consistent and reproducible a year later.
A price solved case by case cannot be explained, cannot be approved in advance, and would not reproduce. Solving a policy for the population and evaluating it at the individual gives the same economics with none of that.
Every quote you have issued is an experiment you already ran: a rate was offered and the applicant either took it or walked. That is the take up curve, and it comes out of ordinary origination. Campaign history is only needed for proactive outreach.
If a segment holds too little rate variation to learn from, the card keeps your current rate there and marks it unlearned. That is exactly the segment where a short rate trial is worth running.
Most lenders price in a narrow band off one card, so the variation needed to estimate response is thin and confounded by who was offered what. Three sources of variation, in the order you can actually get them.
Declined and lapsed quotes carry the rate offered and the customer who walked. This is the cheapest evidence of price sensitivity you already hold.
Members either side of a rate tier cut off are near identical on risk and received materially different prices. That discontinuity is a natural experiment sitting in your history.
Where the first two are thin, a rate trial answers it directly. Take up is observed in days and at high volume, so rate trials are powered where loss trials are not.
Consumer rates are published, so where you sit against the market is observable and can be carried into the model rather than argued about in the pricing meeting.
What you can say to a customer depends on what you already hold about them. Three positions, and most lenders are in more than one at once.
Mutuals, banks, anyone with the deposit relationship.
Salary credits, rent and mortgage payments, spending, buffer and savings trajectory are already in your core system. This is the same cashflow evidence an SME lender has to buy through open banking, and it sits unused in most mutuals outside fraud monitoring.
Non bank lenders, finance companies, card issuers.
Repayment conduct on your own facility, origination data that ages, and bureau information. Thinner, and it tells you how they behave with you rather than how the household actually runs. Enough to rank and to price, not enough to be certain.
Acquisition and prospect campaigns.
Prescreening through the bureau returns who is ineligible and nothing else; no credit information comes back to you. The offer rests on your own criteria plus that flag, and the applicant’s own data arrives only if they respond and consent.
A rate and offer plan across products and months, with recommended actions ranked by what they are worth and every exclusion applied before anything reaches a member.
Highlighted cells are proposed changes awaiting approval.
Illustrative example. Every recommendation carries the evidence behind it and a control group by default, so what it actually earned can be read afterwards.
Three sources, each in its own lane. Published rates are public. Quote outcomes are yours. Bureau evidence of accounts opened elsewhere is used only inside a permitted purpose, as portfolio review rather than as marketing data.
Illustrative example. Win rate is measured on your own quotes. Attrition is accounts closed and refinanced elsewhere, observed under portfolio review.
Competitor rate cards and comparison site listings, collected on a schedule, so your percentile position is a measured number rather than an opinion formed in the pricing meeting.
Every quote you made, the rate offered, and whether it converted. This is the only source that tells you what a specific member did when shown a specific price, and almost no lender uses it.
Enquiry activity shows a member is shopping; comprehensive credit reporting shows an account opened elsewhere. Used as portfolio review and monitoring, which is the lane the Privacy Act allows, and never as a marketing feed. Prescreening returns eligibility only, not attributes, and the engine is built on that basis.
Advertised rates tracked week by week against yours, and every campaign or repricing read against a held out control so the effect can be separated from what would have happened anyway.
Your move in week six took you from fourth to second in the set. Two competitors followed within a fortnight.
Illustrative example. The campaign booked $420k of uplift and added $46k of margin. Without the control group, the first number is the one that gets reported.
Tracking answers what the market did. The control group answers what you caused. A pricing decision needs both.
Every price carries the objective it was set against and the constraint that bound it.
Rate per segment, product and term, with the binding constraint named.
rates / personal_36m8.90% for this segment, up from a card rate of 9.45%, bound by rate dispersion rather than by expected loss.
What to charge, and which constraint you would have to relax to do better.
The frontier between return on assets, growth, retention and member benefit.
frontier / weightsWhat the book earns and what it retains at each weighting, so the choice is made explicitly rather than implied by a spreadsheet.
A trade off your board can approve, in the terms mutuals are held to.
Take up and attrition against rate, per segment, with the uncertainty around them.
elasticity / by_segmentWhere the curve is steep, where it is flat, and where the data is too thin to say, marked as such.
Where a rate move buys volume and where it only gives away margin.
Campaign or repricing effect against a held out control.
readout / campaign_q3Uplift, cannibalisation, pull forward, funding, loss and servicing, ending in margin actually added.
Whether the campaign made money, rather than whether it booked volume.
Illustrative specimens. Available segments and curve precision depend on the rate variation and campaign history in your own data.
Including the ones where the answer is that your data is not ready yet.
Any lending product where a rate, limit, term or offer is set and an outcome follows: personal loans, car and secured lending, credit cards, overdrafts, home loans and SME facilities. Channels are handled separately rather than averaged, because branch, online and broker applicants behave differently at the same price and a single elasticity curve across all three is usually wrong.
Technically the engine can reprice as often as your data arrives, including daily. In practice lending rarely should. Advertised rates carry approval and disclosure obligations, and an engine that changes a headline rate faster than your governance can follow creates a conduct problem rather than a margin gain. We normally recommend a monthly cadence with an on demand run when the market moves, and the cadence is a rule you set rather than something the engine decides. Existing contracts are never repriced.
Product, term, channel, risk band, tenure and segment, down to whatever your systems can actually apply. We do not recommend a distinct price per individual even where it is technically possible; in consumer lending that raises fairness and explainability questions that are hard to answer in front of a regulator, and the margin difference over well built segments is small. The engine will hold segment sizes to a floor you set.
Optimisation runs on segments rather than on individuals, so the problem size is set by products, terms, channels and bands rather than by member count. Books in the hundreds of thousands are routine at this shape. The binding constraint is almost never compute; it is how much rate variation your history contains.
Rate and rate tiers, limits, term, fee structure, offer eligibility, retention offers for members at refinance risk, and the size and timing of campaigns. Scenarios can be simulated before anything goes live: what a quarter point move does to take up, attrition, return on assets and the book, with the uncertainty around each.
Yes. Consumer rates are published, so a feed of competitor and comparison site rates is collected on a schedule and carried into the optimiser as a market position rule rather than as background reading. If you already licence a competitive feed we use it; if not, published rates cover most of what matters for consumer products.
Sometimes, and the honest answer comes from looking rather than from a claim. Declined and lapsed quotes usually carry enough rate variation to start, and existing tier boundaries give a natural experiment either side of each cut off. Where both are thin for a segment, the curve is marked unreliable rather than smoothed over, and a short rate trial answers it properly.
That is why objectives are weighted rather than ranked. Return on assets, growth, retention and member benefit are optimised together, and the frontier between them is shown so the board approves a position rather than inherits one. A single objective optimiser is the wrong tool for a mutual, which is most of why the generic pricing tools do not fit.
Exclusions are enforced inside the optimiser rather than applied afterwards, so hardship flags and eligibility rules bind before a rate is proposed. Every price is recorded with the inputs, weights and constraints in force, and each one reports which constraint bound it. That is the evidence a design and distribution review asks for. It does not replace your compliance framework; it produces what the framework requires.
We read from wherever your data already lives: a warehouse such as Snowflake, Databricks, BigQuery or SQL Server, extracts from your core banking and origination systems, or a secure file transfer if that is simpler. Outputs come back as a rate card file, an API call at quote time, or a table in your warehouse. A first engagement usually runs on an extract, with integration only once the value is proven.
By holding a control group and reading the difference. Volume alone cannot tell you, because a campaign always books volume. The read out separates what the change added from what would have happened anyway, and reports it after funding, expected loss and servicing.
LuminoEvidence builds the risk model that sets the floor beneath the price. LuminoTrial runs the rate trials where history cannot answer the question. LuminoOffer sets the price and measures what it earned. They are bought separately and designed to compound.
Name a product line and we will look at whether your own data can tell you what the right rate is.